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Chapter    14  
Brexit: Free movement of Union citizens 
and the Rights of Third-Country 
Nationals under Threat? 
Kees Groenendijk 
14.1. Introduction 
The outcome of the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 created a shock in the UK 
and in other Member States. The immediate and long-term effects on the 
capacity of nationals of all 28 current Member States to move to and stay in other 
Member States became the subject of personal worries and public debate. 
Suddenly, free movement to and from Britain was no longer self-evident. The 
outcome of the forthcoming negotiations on the conditions of the Brexit will 
remain unknown for months or years. The outcome of the negotiations between 
the UK and the other Member States and the dubious position of several EU 
institutions during those negotiations, all intended to avoid a Brexit, most 
probably will never achieve the force of law. Nevertheless, the texts agreed may 
well influence the development of free movement law in the years to come. 
 
On 19 February 2016 the Heads of State and Government of the 28 Member States, 
“meeting within the European Council”, agreed on a Decision concerning “a new 
settlement for the United Kingdom within in the EU”. The text of the Decision 
was published as an Annex to the conclusions of the European Council.1 The 
Decision is an informal agreement between the 28 Member States aiming at 
changing elements of Union law without amending the Treaties. The Decision is 
a piece of international law not an instrument of Union law. Hence, the Court of 
Justice cannot rule on the validity of the Decision, but it may be asked to rule on 
the compatibility of some of the changes agreed with the Treaties. The Decision 
provides in Section E that it “shall take effect on the same date as the 
Government of the United Kingdom informs the Secretary-General of the Council 
                                                             
1  EUCO (European Council document) 10/16 of 19 February 2016, p. 8-37. 
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that the United Kingdom has decided to remain a member of the European 
Union”. Considering that a majority of the British voters in the referendum on 23 
June 2016 voted to leave the EU, it is highly unlikely that this condition will be 
fulfilled. Most probably, the agreement formulated in the February 2016 Decision 
will never enter into force. Nevertheless, the Decision may have far-reaching 
political, constitutional, legal and practical consequences within the Union and 
its remaining Member States. In this contribution I will describe and comment 
on the elements of the Decision concerning free movement of Union citizens, 
deal with the potential effects for Union citizens and for nationals from countries 
outside the EU and conclude with some remarks on the wider implications of the 
Decision. 
14.2. The democratic deficit of intergovernmental cooperation 
Before I embark on that programme, it should be noted that the preparation of 
the Decision was not an example of democratic decision making. UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron in 2013 announced the referendum and in 2014 outlined 
his wishes for reform of Union law in public speeches. In 2015 he twice spoke 
briefly in the European Council about his desire to start negotiations on this issue 
without further specification.2 It was only after being pressured by his colleagues 
that Cameron wrote a letter to the President of the European Council in 
November 2015 outlining the areas in which he was seeking reform “to address 
the concerns of the British people over our membership of the European Union”.3 
From the summer of 2015, UK officials held “technical discussions” with officials 
of the European Commission. During these discussions three wishes formulated 
by Cameron in his speeches in 2014, were, apparently, dropped: EU workers 
should have a confirmed job offer before admission in another Member State, no 
social benefits and social housing for EU nationals from other Member States 
during the first four years and the introduction of long-term re-entry bans in 
cases of begging or fraud. These demands did not appear in the November 2015 
letter. Negotiations between the Member States with the participation of the 
European Commission started only after the December 2015 European Council. 
They resulted in a draft Decision published on 2 February 2016.4 Two weeks later 
the Decision was adopted. Thus, the European Parliament, national parliaments 
and the general public in the Member States were effectively given only two 
weeks to read, comment on the draft and try to influence the content of the 
Decision. According to press reports, the European Parliament’s (EP) President 
                                                             
2  EUCO 22/15, p. 8 and EUCO 26/15, p. 6. 
3  Letter of 10 November 2015 to Donald Tusk. 
4  EUCO 4/16 of 2 February 2016. 
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and leaders of the three main political factions in the EP were invited by Donald 
Tusk to his office on 19 February 2016 to give their opinion on or, possibly, their 
informal consent to the text of the Decision.5  
 
The ordinary procedure for amending the Treaties in Article 48 TEU provides that 
the national parliaments shall be informed about the proposals for amendment 
before a decision is made to amend the Treaties and that a decision to amend 
comes into effect after national approval according to the Member States’ 
constitutional procedures, often involving their parliaments. Even the ordinary 
legislative process of the EU provides for far more and longer opportunities for 
public and parliamentary participation than the negotiations between Member 
States on the Decision of 19 February 2016.6 The Legal Service of the Council 
assured the European Council that the Decision “does not require any formality 
for the parties to express their consent to be bound. It does not require any 
formality such as signing or notification of having accomplished a formal 
ratification or any other procedure in accordance with constitutional require-
ments.”7 The Legal Service’s opinion was sought after publication of the Draft 
Decision within three days of being requested. Following this advice, the consent 
of the national parliaments was not made a requirement for the entry into force 
of the Decision, although enhancing the role of national parliaments was one of 
the explicit aims of the Decision (see Section C). Politicians who criticize the 
democratic deficit of the EU and propose intergovernmental cooperation as an 
attractive alternative for EU membership, often forget that that intergovern-
mental cooperation has far fewer guarantees for democratic participation in the 
legislative process than provided by the current, admittedly imperfect, law 
making in the EU.  
14.3. What did Member State agree on Free Movement and Social 
Security? 
The Decision has four main sections entitled Economic Governance, 
Competitiveness, Sovereignty and, finally, “Social Benefits and Free Movement”. 
This chapter focuses on the last section (Section D). This section is by far the 
longest and most detailed section of the Decision. Moreover, three detailed 
                                                             
5  Volkskrant, 27 February 2016. 
6  For more details see: Meijers Committee, Accommodating British EU-demands and democratic 
change of the Treaties, CM 1516 of 27 October 2015. 
7  EUCO 15/16 of 8 February 2016, par. 5; for a critical discussion of the role of the Council’s Legal 
Service see E. Guild, Brexit and its consequences for the UK and EU Citizenship or Monstrous 
Citizenship, inaugural lecture at Queen Mary University of London, 27 September 2016. 
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declarations of the Commission with respect to the issues dealt with in Section D 
are attached to the Decision. This may reflect the level of agreement between 
some Member States and the centrality of these issues during the negotiations. In 
this section Member States for the first time since the beginning of free 
movement in the EEC agreed on major restrictions of three central elements of 
the right to free movement of Union citizens: their security of residence, their 
right to family reunification and the equal treatment of EU workers. The agreed 
changes in Section D of the Decision are presented as new interpretations of 
existing primary and secondary EU rules (under the heading “Interpretation of 
current EU rules”) or as amendments to existing Union law (“Changes to EU 
secondary legislation”). Further amendments of secondary EU law are to be 
found in the three Declarations annexed to the Decision in which the 
Commission promises to propose changes in all three central secondary law 
instruments in this field: Directive 2004/38 on free movement of Union citizens, 
Regulation 492/2011 on free movement of workers and Regulation 883/2004 on 
the coordination of social security systems.  
 
According to the Decision and the relevant European Council Conclusions, the 
“arrangements” of the Decision “are fully compatible with the Treaties”. The 
Treaties are not amended. But whether the agreed amendments and inter-
pretations are compatible with the Treaties is subject to considerable doubt. 
14.3.1. The emergency brake and the reduced exportation of child benefits for EU 
workers 
With regard to social benefits two major changes were agreed: the introduction of 
the “emergency brake” on non-contributory in-work benefits and the 
“indexation” (read: reduction) of the child benefits to children of EU workers who 
do not accompany the worker. The Commission promised to make a proposal to 
introduce a “safeguard mechanism” in Regulation 492/2011 allowing the Council 
in cases of exceptional inflow of workers from other Member States to decide on 
a proposal from the Commission to authorise a Member State to limit the access 
of newly arriving EU workers to non-contributory in-work benefits for the first 
seven years of employment in that Member State. The Commission in advance of 
the possible entry into force of the Decision stated that the UK would be fully 
justified in triggering this safeguard mechanism considering the information 
provided by the UK and “in particular as it has not made full use of the 
transitional periods on free movement of workers which were provided for in 
recent Accession Acts”.8 This early green light for the UK was justified as 
retroactive compensation for having allowed free movement workers from new 
                                                             
8  EUCO 10/16, p. 23 and Annex VI on p. 34. 
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Member States during the transitional periods, disregarding the benefits from 
their employment. 
  
The Commission also promised the Member States to propose amendments to 
Regulation 883/2004 in order to allow Member States to reduce the child benefits 
paid for children of EU workers who remained in the Member State of origin or 
another Member State, taking into account the standard of living and the level of 
child benefits applicable in that Member State.9 Until 2020 this indexation would 
only apply to “new” workers. The EU workers under the new rules would pay 
social contributions and taxes according to the (higher) level of the Member State 
where he or she was employed and receive the lower child benefits applicable in 
the Member State of origin. The Court of Justice in 1986 and again in 1989 had 
held a similar rule in Regulation 1408/71 to be a typical example of indirect 
discrimination, incompatible with the equal treatment clause in Article 48 EEC 
Treaty, since national workers would rarely be confronted with a reduction in 
benefits.10 Would the Court interpret the prohibition on discrimination on the 
ground of nationality in Article 18 TFEU of the same Treaty differently 30 years 
later, because the benefits would now be only reduced to the level in the Member 
State of origin, rather than not being paid abroad at all?11 The Member States in 
the Decision promised that they would do their best to ensure a rapid adoption of 
both proposals.12  
14.3.2. Limiting security of residence of EU citizens 
In the Decision the Member States also agreed to expand the interpretation of 
the public policy exception allowing for expulsion of Union citizens in cases 
where that expulsion would not be allowed under the current interpretation of 
primary and secondary Union law (Article 45 TFEU and Articles 27 and 28 of 
Directive 2004/38) by the Court of Justice. The Decision states that Member 
States may take “the necessary restrictive measures to protect themselves against 
individuals whose personal conduct is likely to represent a genuine and serious 
threat to public policy or security. In determining whether the conduct of an 
individual poses a present threat to public policy or security, Member States may 
take into account past conduct of the individual concerned and the threat may 
not always need to be imminent. Even in the absence of a previous criminal 
conviction, Member States may act on preventative grounds, so long as they are 
                                                             
9  EUCO 10/16, p. 22 and Annex V on p. 33. 
10  CJEU 15 January 1986, C-41/84, Pinna I, ECR I-17, par. 23-24; CJEU 2 March 1987, C-359/87, Pinna 
II, ECR I-610. 
11  See also the contribution of Minderhoud: Chapter four in this volume. 
12  EUCO 10/16, p. 23.  
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specific to the individual concerned.”13 This formulation departs on at least two 
grounds from the constant interpretation of the public policy exception in the 
EEC/EC/EU Treaty and the current TFEU by the Court of Justice since the 1977 
Bouchereau judgment14 until today, an interpretation which the Member States 
unanimously codified in 2004 in Article 27 of Directive 2004/38. Firstly, the 
requirement that threat to public policy needs to be actual or present has been 
implicitly deleted. Secondly, Member States and the Commission explicitly 
agreed that the important guarantee that Union citizens can only be expelled on 
the ground of serious criminal offences for which they have been convicted by a 
court would disappear. The procedural guarantees of criminal law, which, 
generally, offer citizens far more protection than immigration law procedures can 
be circumvented if Member States want to expel Union citizens. 
 
The European Commission in Annex VII further declared that it would “clarify 
that Member States may take into account past conduct of an individual in the 
determination of whether a Union citizen's conduct poses a "present" threat to 
public policy or security. They may act on grounds of public policy or public 
security even in the absence of a previous criminal conviction on preventative 
grounds but specific to the individual concerned.” The Commission also 
promised to clarify the notions of "serious grounds of public policy or public 
security" and "imperative grounds of public security". How, the Commission 
imagined that it had the power to depart from the constant case law of the Court 
and the text of a Directive in guidelines remains unclear. 
 
Apparently, Member States and the Commission considered that guidelines 
might not be sufficient to amend Union law and they agreed that amendment of 
the secondary law was necessary to reach the desired goal. This explains the final 
and rather vague declaration that “on the occasion of a future revision of 
Directive 2004/38 on free movement of Union citizens, the Commission will 
examine the thresholds to which these notions are connected.”15 This implies 
amending Article 28 of Directive 2004/38. That occasion could have been present 
on short notice, since on the previous page of the same declaration the 
Commission promised to introduce a proposal to amend Directive 2004/38 in 
order to severely restrict the right to family reunification of mobile Union 
citizens.  
                                                             
13  EUCO 10/16, p. 21. 
14  CJEU 27 October 1977, C-30/77, Regina, ECLI:EU:C:1977:172. 
15  EUCO 10/16, Annex VII on p. 36.  
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14.3.3. Reduction of the right to family reunification 
The most far-reaching change in free movement law is not mentioned in the 
Decision at all, but only in a declaration by the Commission in Annex VII. In the 
Decision the Member States under the heading “Interpretation of current EU 
rules” stated: “In accordance with Union law, Member States are able to take 
action to prevent abuse of rights or fraud, such as the presentation of forged 
documents, and address cases of contracting or maintaining marriages of 
convenience with third country nationals for the purpose of making use of free 
movement as a route for regularising unlawful stay in a Member State or address 
cases of making use of free movement as a route for bypassing national 
immigration rules applying to third country nationals.”16 
 
The Commission, accordingly, promised to clarify (read: publish guidelines) that: 
“Member States can address specific cases of abuse of free movement rights by 
Union citizens returning to their Member State of nationality with a non-EU 
family member where residence in the host Member State has not been 
sufficiently genuine to create or strengthen family life and had the purpose of 
evading the application of national immigration rules.”17 Moreover, the 
Commission redefined the concept of marriage of convenience, now covering “a 
marriage which is maintained for the purpose of enjoying a right of residence by 
a family member who is not a national of a Member State”. According to the 
Commission this concept is not protected under Union law, although the concept 
is explicitly mentioned in Article 35 of Directive 2004/38 and Article 16 of 
Directive 2003/86. The Commission’s declaration further disregards the far more 
restrictive definition in the latter Article: “the marriage, partnership or adoption 
was contracted for the sole purpose of enabling the person concerned to enter or 
reside in a Member State”. 
 
The Commission’s declaration on reunification with third-country national 
family members goes far beyond the text of Decision of the Heads of 
Governments. The Commission in Annex VII expressed its intention “to adopt a 
proposal to complement [sic] Directive 2004/38 on free movement of Union 
citizens in order to exclude, from the scope of free movement rights, third 
country nationals who had no prior lawful residence in a Member State before 
marrying a Union citizen or who marry a Union citizen only after the Union 
citizen has established residence in the host Member State. Accordingly, in such 
cases, the host Member State's immigration law will apply to the third country 
                                                             
16  EUCO 10/16, p. 21. 
17  EUCO 10/16, Annex VII on p. 35. 
290  Chapter Fourteen KEES GROENENDIJK 
national.”18 This last amendment would overrule the constant case law of the 
Court of Justice on EU nationals returning to their own Member State after 
having used their free movement rights in Surinder Singh (1992), Eind (2007) and 
O & B (2014).19 The effect of this amendment would be that Union citizens would 
have to choose between remaining with their spouse in the host Member State or 
returning to the home Member State without his or her spouse, who would then 
remain alone in the host Member State or be obliged to return to a third country. 
 
The right of workers (later Union citizens) to live in the host Member State with 
their third-country national family members was granted in 1961 in the first 
Regulation on the free movement of workers and was confirmed by the Court in 
its case law. In the Metock judgment the Court rejected the plea of several 
Member States that family reunification should no longer be a right of the EU 
national but subject to national immigration law.20 The Court rejected that plea 
among others as contrary to the idea of an Internal Market with common rules, 
different rules on family reunification would then apply in each Member State 
and because the Union legislator could not reasonably have had in mind to place 
Union nationals in a worse position than lawfully resident third-country 
nationals whose right to family reunification had been granted in Directive 
2004/86. After the Metock judgment some Member States (Ireland, Denmark, and 
the UK) in 2008 proposed to amend Union law in order to overrule this 
judgment, arguing “significant misuse” of the rules on family reunification. But 
France and other Member States voiced opposition and the proposal was 
dropped after the Commission’s promise to issue Guidelines on the application of 
the Directive.21 In 2011 the Dutch minority government published a position paper 
advocating reduction of the right to family reunification of Union citizens in 
Directive 2004/38 to the level of the far more restricted right to family 
reunification of lawfully resident third-country nationals under Directive 
2003/86. That government depended on a formal agreement on immigration 
issues with Geert Wilders and on the votes of the MPs of his one-member 
political party for its majority in parliament. This Dutch proposal received little 
support from other Member States. But in 2016 in its Declaration in Annex VII, 
the Commission promised to go much further, by proposing complete abolish-
ment of the right to family reunification in Union law for Union citizens moving 
                                                             
18  EUCO 10/16, Annex VII on p. 35. 
19  CJEU 7 July 1992, C-370/90 Surinder Singh, ECLI:EU:C:1992:296; CJEU 11 December 2007, 
C-291/05, Eind, ECLI:EU:C:2007:771; CJEU 12 March 2014, C-456/12, O & B, ECLI:EU:C:2014:135. 
20  CJEU 25 July 2008, C-127/08, Metock, ECLI:EU:C:2008:449. 
21  See the report on the September 2008 JHA Council and Council documents nos. 15903/08, 
16151/08, 16483/08, 10551/09 and 13467/09. 
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to other Member States. This would mean a return to the situation before the 
beginning of the first transitional phase of free movement in 1961. Did the 
Commission really think that the Court would no longer adhere to the arguments 
it mentioned in the Metock judgment in 2008? 
14.4. Wider implications of the Decision 
In the Decision the Member States for the first time since 1961 agreed to reduce 
the right to free movement of Union citizens. In the five decades after 1961 the 
Member States in the Council (until 2004 the main Union legislator) and the 
Court gradually extended the personal scope of free movement and the material 
and procedural rights attached to it. Moreover, the personal and geographical 
scope of free movement was extended with the accession of new Member States 
in 2004, 2007 and 2013. Only on a few occasions was free movement somewhat 
reduced by the introduction of a new restriction or the abolishment of a 
protective rule. The 2003 Akrich judgment22, requiring admission of TCN family 
members under national law, which was explicitly overruled by the Grand 
Chamber of the Court five years later in Metock and the abolishment in Directive 
2004/38 of the automatic suspensive effect of an appeal against a decision to end 
the residence right of a Union citizen which was part of free movement law since 
1964 are examples of such rare regressions. Until recently, the general line of 
development extended free movement of EU citizens.  
14.4.1. A better deal for Britain, but also for other Member States? 
The Decision was presented as a “better deal” for Britain, but the new rules and 
new interpretations would apply, generally, to all 28 Member States. On the four 
issues discussed above, the Decision reflected not only British wishes but also old 
wishes of at least three other Member States. Three of the four issues (restriction 
of access of EU nationals to social benefits, wider possibilities for expulsion and 
restriction of reunification with TCN family members) were raised by the 
Ministers of Interior of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in a letter 
to the EU Council in April 2013.23 The European Commission in 2013 reacted with 
a letter pointing to the absence of data on the postulated abuse, fraud and 
benefits tourism of nationals of other Member States. This effort to give the 
debate a more rational basis failed as the authors of the letter did not provide 
serious data. The four Member States did not get much support in the Council 
and the letter gradually disappeared from the agenda of the Council.24 Three 
                                                             
22  CJEU 23 September 2003, C-109/01, Akrich, ECLI:EU:C:2003:491. 
23  Published in council document 10313/13 of 31 May 2013. 
24  Groenendijk, K., ‘Recent Developments in the EU Law on Migration: The Legislative 
Patchwork and the Court’s Approach’, EJML 2014, p. 313-335, at p. 318ff. 
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years later the same Member States were able to get more support from other 
Member States and the Commission, apparently, changed its position. The initial 
opposition changed to cooperation with Member States’ wishes to an extent that 
at certain points were hardly compatible with the Commission’s role as guardian 
of the Treaties in question.  
 
The issue of reduction of child benefits for children of EU workers remaining in 
another Member State was not mentioned in the 2013 letter from the four 
Ministers. But reducing child benefits for children living abroad has been a 
recurrent issue in several Member States. The two Pinna judgments in the 1980s 
concerned the exception in the original Regulation 1408/71 allowing France not to 
pay child benefits for the children of Italian workers who remained in Italy. The 
German and the Austrian chancellor immediately after the adoption of the 
Decision on 19 February 2016 announced a reduction of child benefits for 
children living elsewhere in the EU and the Dutch authorities published the total 
amount of benefits paid to Polish nationals employed in the Netherlands for their 
children living in Poland (16 million euro in 2015).25 
14.4.2. Who can overrule the Court? 
Several elements of the Decision clearly intended to overrule established 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice either by amending secondary law or by 
giving a (new) interpretation to existing primary and secondary Union law that 
clearly departs from or is hardly compatible with interpretations given by the 
Court. This concerns not only old and established judgments (Bouchereau 1977, 
Pinna I 1986, Pinna II 1989 and Singh 1992) but also more recent judgments such 
as Eind 2007, Metock 2008 and O & B 2014. In the EU just as in Member States the 
democratically legitimated legislator can overrule case law of the courts, within 
the limits set by the constitution or Treaties. But the legislator has to play by the 
rules in changing the law. He cannot simply dictate binding new interpretations 
without changing the law. This also applies in the EU: neither a consensus among 
Member States nor a statement by the Commission is sufficient for changing 
Union law. The case law interpreting the current law remains in force, until the 
Union legislator changes the rules or the Court decides that its previous case law 
is no longer valid. The Member States are Masters of the Treaties. With consensus 
they can amend the Treaties, but in February 2016 on paper they decided to leave 
the Treaties unchanged. The European Council Conclusions state that the 
“arrangements” of the Decision “are fully compatible with the Treaties”. The first 
recital of the Decision states that Member States settled issues raised by the 
                                                             
25  Suddeutsche Zeitung 20 February 2016; Die Presse 20 February 2016; Volkskrant 16 April 2016. 
See also the contribution of Minderhoud: Chapter four in this volume. 
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United Kingdom in its letter of 10 November 2015 “in conformity with the 
Treaties”.26 But Member States cannot authoritatively declare that their new 
interpretations of the unchanged Articles 45 and 48 TFEU are correct, nor do they 
have the power to declare that the amendments of secondary law sketched in the 
Decision, if adopted by the legislator, are in conformity with the Treaties. That 
power resides with the Court of Justice only. The European Council is a political 
institution not a legislator. Member States only make primary Union law. 
Secondary union law is made by the Council and the Parliament upon a proposal 
of the Commission. 
14.5. Possible effects of the Decision 
The Decision of 19 February 2016 will probably never become legally binding on 
the Member States. As long as the Decision does not enter into force, none of the 
EU institutions will be bound by it. Nevertheless, the Decision may still be 
politically relevant and have real effects in the practice of EU institutions and 
Member States’ authorities.  
 
The Commission in three declarations attached to the Decision agreed to 
introduce proposals to amend Directive 2004/38, Regulation 883/2004 and 
Regulation 492/2011 and to publish new guidelines concerning the interpretation 
and application of Directive 2004/38. The Commission is not bound by its 
declaration when the Decision does not enter into force. Certainly, Commission 
guidelines cannot overrule the case law of the Court of Justice, however much 
Member States agree with the content of such guidelines. Most probably, 
between February and July 2016, Commission officials were busy preparing drafts 
of those documents, which are now stored in the files. Actually, the Commission 
and its officials may feel relieved, if after the negotiations with Member States’ 
officials on the 2009 Guidelines for better application of the Directive and on its 
2014 Handbook on marriages of convenience,27 it does not have to negotiate and 
publish yet another document with different interpretations on the same issues. 
But the Commission may be asked to draft texts on the same issues during the 
negotiations on Brexit. There may well be demand for new rules on those issues 
on both sides of the negotiation table again. 
 
The Court of Justice in pending or new cases may be confronted by Member States 
with the argument that the content of the Decision represents a consensus 
between Member States on how the current Union law on free movement should 
                                                             
26  See point 2 at p. 1 of conclusions EUCO 1/16 and p. 8. 
27  COM(2009)313 and COM(2014)604. 
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be interpreted. The Court may feel political pressure to depart from its case law 
and implement some of the agreed changes in the Decision. The recent 
judgments in Dano28, Alimanovic29, Garcia Nieto30 and Commission/UK31 on the 
entitlement of Union citizens to social benefits are perceived as a similar 
response by the Court to the prolonged debate in several Member States on the 
so-called benefits tourism.32 But departing from long-standing case law 
interpreting Treaty provisions on free movement or equal treatment of EU 
workers on the basis of a political decision that did not enter into force is quite 
another matter. As long as the outcome of the negotiations between the 27 
Member States and the UK is unknown, it will be difficult and unattractive for the 
Court to anticipate that outcome. 
 
In the Member States which in recent years have been lobbying in Brussels for 
similar restrictions of free movement as formulated in the Decision, politicians 
and national immigration authorities may be inclined to consider the consent of 
other Member States in February 2016 as a sign of support for their views and 
start to apply the new interpretations of the existing EU free movement law 
concerning the public policy exception or family reunification at national level 
through changes in national law or administrative practices. Member States are 
bound to apply Union law as interpreted by the Court, but it may take years 
before a case on such premature application of the standards formulated in the 
Decision reaches the Court.  
 
Finally, the remaining 27 Member States, especially the ones that for many years 
have been campaigning for these changes, could be inclined to use the 
negotiations with the UK on the consequences of the forthcoming Brexit as an 
opportunity to introduce some of the changes formulated in the Decision into 
Union law as part of the new deal with the UK. This may be the case, if the UK 
opts to become an EEA State (the “Norwegian model”); amending certain 
EU/EEA rules in order to restrict free movement could be attractive also in selling 
this outcome in the UK to those who voted to leave the EU. In February 2016 
Member States tried to address the wishes of the UK government without 
amending the Treaties. The departure of the UK from the Union will make 
                                                             
28  CJEU 11 November 2014, C-333/13, Dano, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358. 
29  CJEU 15 September 2015, C-67/14, Alimanovic, ECLI:EU:2015:597. 
30  CJEU 25 February 2016, C-299/14, Garcia-Nieto, ECLI:EU:C:2016:114. 
31  CJEU 14 June 2016, C-308/14, Com/UK, ECLI:EU:C:2016:436. 
32  See: Sandra Mantu & Paul Minderhoud, Social rights as a case of Europeanization through law. 
The role of CJEU jurisprudence, Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series, no 2016/01, 
Nijmegen: Radboud University Nijmegen. 
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amendment of the Treaties unavoidable and thus create an opportunity to 
amend the Treaties on other issues as well. It is a political question whether the 
27 Member States will be prepared to grant the UK more room to restrict the 
movement of their nationals to and from the UK, once the UK is no longer an EU 
Member State, than they granted the UK in February 2016 with the aim of 
avoiding the Brexit. 
14.6. Union citizens and third-country nationals will be affected 
Who will be affected if the changes in EU free movement law formulated in the 
Decision in one way or another come into force some day in the future? The 
categories primarily affected will be workers from Member States that recently 
acceded to the Union, EU workers with little education and income, EU citizens 
of immigrant origin and nationals of third countries. Most students and highly 
educated or well paid workers, irrespective of their nationality, will only be 
marginally affected. 
 
The exclusion from social and tax benefits and the reduction of child benefits will 
primarily affect workers and the self-employed with a low income. The benefits 
are designed especially to assist low income groups. For those with a higher 
income child benefits represent only a small proportion of their income. Workers 
from “new” Member States, employed in “old” Member States, tend to be 
employed in low paid jobs. Moreover, they will, on average, have shorter periods 
of residence than mobile workers from “old” Member States and thus will rarely 
be affected by the “emergency brake”. Replacement of EU free movement rules 
on family reunification by the national rules of Member States will put an 
additional burden on low income workers unable to meet the national income 
requirement without taking an additional job. Several Member States in recent 
years have raised the income requirement in order to reduce family migration. 
Under the current UK rules persons with an income below the national median 
de facto are excluded from reunification with their non-EU family members. In 
the Netherlands almost half of the refusals of family reunification with non-EU 
family members are founded on the sponsor not meeting the income 
requirement.33 
 
Union citizens of immigrant origin clearly will be affected more often than other 
(“native”) Union citizens by the abolition of the right to family reunification with 
                                                             
33  Kulu-Glasgow, I. et al. (2016), Schijn bedriegt, Een onderzoek naar de prevalentie en ver-
schijningsvormen van schijnrelaties, WODC cahier 2016-6, The Hague: Ministry of Security and 
Justice, p. 79. 
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third-country national family members, since the first group will more often have 
relationships with third-country nationals and more often marry third-country 
nationals than “native” Union citizens. EU citizens of immigrant origin, generally, 
will be more mobile within the EU than “native” EU citizens, if only because they 
will have more often family members, friends or co-ethnics in other Member 
States than the “native” Union citizen. Hence, they, arguably, will also be more 
often affected by the other three restrictions formulated in the Decision. 
 
The Decision of February 2016 deals almost exclusively with the rights of Union 
citizens. Only the abolishment of the EU right to live together with third-country 
family members and of the right to accompany the EU spouse or parent returning 
to his or her home Member State will clearly have direct negative effects for those 
non-EU family members. But the changes in free movement law, if actually 
implemented, will in several ways have far-reaching indirect effects for the rights 
of third-country nationals. 
 
Firstly, abolishment of the right of EU nationals to live with their non-EU family 
members in another Member State, as provided in Community and EU law since 
1961, and making their family reunification dependent on national law, will raise 
the question of whether EU nationals in this respect can be treated less 
favourably than lawfully resident third-country nationals who have a right to 
family reunification granted by Directive 2003/86. It will be hard to justify this 
difference in treatment under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR. This will then in turn result 
in pressure by Member States to reduce the level of rights granted to third-
country nationals in that Directive. 
 
Secondly, in several Directives and other instruments on third-country nationals 
the Union legislator used the rules of free movement as a model or used the same 
concept as in instruments on free movement of Union citizens. In a series of 
recent judgments the Court of Justice interpreted those concepts in instruments 
on third-country nationals as having the same or a similar meaning. For instance, 
the Court held that the concept of “risk to public policy” in the Returns Directive, 
the Refugee Qualification Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive 
presupposes the existence, in addition to the perturbation of the social order 
which any infringement of the law involves, of a genuine, present and sufficiently 
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of by way of analogy 
with its case law on the public policy exception in the rules on free movement of 
Union citizens.34 If the current interpretation of the concept of public policy in 
                                                             
34  CJEU 11 June 2015, C-554/13, Zh & O, ECLI:EU:C:2015:377, point 60 with regard to Article 7(4) of 
Directive 2008/115; CJEU 24 June 2015, C-373/13, H.T., ECLI:EU:C:2015:413, point 79, with regard 
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rules on Union citizens is amended in a restrictive way, because of the analogous 
interpretation by the Court, this will most probably have the effect of reducing 
the rights and protection of third-country nationals under Union law as well. The 
same will apply to Turkish nationals, since the Court has interpreted the public 
policy exception in Association Council Decision 1/80 as having (almost) the 
same meaning as the similar exception in the rules on EU workers.35 
 
Thirdly, the rights of certain categories of third-country nationals are explicitly 
linked to those of EU nationals in a similar position. Article 59 of the Additional 
Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement provides: “In the fields 
covered by this Protocol Turkey shall not receive more favourable treatment than 
that which Member States grant to one another pursuant to the Treaty 
establishing the Community.” According to the non-discrimination clause in 
Article 3 of Association Council Decision 3/80 Turkish workers employed in the 
EU are entitled to full child benefits for their children living in Turkey. If the 
rights of EU workers to child benefits for children living outside the host Member 
State are reduced, a similar reduction will automatically apply for Turkish 
workers as well. 
14.7. Conclusions 
Until now the ordinary legislative procedure in the EU has functioned as a brake 
on demands from Member States to amend the rules on free movement of Union 
citizens in order to restrict free movement and de facto exclude certain 
categories of EU citizens. Over the last decade, the UK and some other Member 
States, with respect to three of the four main elements of the Decision relating to 
free movement, have tabled suggestions or concrete proposals for amendments 
to the EU rules. Only the “emergency brake” was a completely new and British 
issue. The negotiations with the UK provided these Member States with the 
opportunity to realise old wishes without having to respond to the European 
Commission‘s demand for facts instead of sentiments supporting the desired 
changes.  
 
By choosing the form of an intergovernmental agreement and by convincing the 
Commission to propose amendments in secondary law and to make declarations 
that amounted to new interpretations of primary and secondary Union law 
                                                                                                                                                             
to Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/83 (now Directive 2011/95); CJEU 15 February 2016, C-601/15 
PPU, J.N., ECLI:EU:C:2016:284, points 64 ff with regard to Article 8(3) of Directive 2013/32. 
35  CJEU 10 February 2000, C-340/97, Nazli, ECLI:EU:C:2000:77 with a restriction in CJEU 24 
September 2013, C-221/11, Demirkan, ECLI:EU:C:2013:583. 
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departing from settled interpretations of the relevant instruments by the Court of 
Justice, the Member States tried to circumvent the constitutional arrangement of 
the EU and minimize the role of the European Parliament and the national 
parliaments. This road was paved and legitimized by the Council’s Legal Service. 
The Decision of 19 February 2016 is a clear example that intergovernmental 
cooperation is not an attractive alternative for cooperation within the EU. 
Intergovernmental cooperation provides far fewer guarantees for democratic 
participation in the legislative process than the current rules on law making in 
the EU, provided that those rules are observed. 
 
The UK and other Western European Member States in the Decision agreed to 
reduce the rights of workers from Central European Member States and of 
unskilled workers from other Member States. The Decision illustrates the lack of 
solidarity of the richer Member States with the less rich ones. In this respect the 
position of the Visegrad countries in the forthcoming negotiations on Brexit will 
be of interest. Those negotiations, probably, will take more time and be more 
visible than the negotiations on the Decision. 
 
The Decision constituted a clear effort by Member States to shift competence 
from EU level to national level. It is a clear example of renationalization 
(“repatriation of sovereignty”) with respect to one of the four central freedoms of 
the Treaties. The Decision would have made the EU a less social and more 
economic undertaking. The decrease in equal treatment with regard to basic 
social rights, the abolishment of the right to family reunification and the 
reduction of the security of residence would have removed three essential 
elements of Union citizenship. EU nationals residing in another Member State 
were to become more “foreigners” and less citizens. The agreed reduction of 
rights of EU nationals would have reduced rights of third-country nationals as 
well. This side effect did not get any visible attention during the negotiation 
process. Would this reduction have enhanced the integration of the large 
majority of EU nationals and TCNs lawfully residing in the Member States or 
would it have created new barriers to that integration?  
 
The Decision most probably will never enter into force. But it has to be seen how 
the 27 remaining Member States will approach the same issues during the 
forthcoming negotiations on Brexit. Will the governments of some Member 
States use these negotiations as another opportunity to reduce the rights of 
Union citizens, in the hope of appeasing and re-attracting their citizens voting for 
populist or anti-immigrant parties? 
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